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序时录
  • 序时录 - 书单与记录
  • 书单
    • 《开放社会及其敌人》
    • 《社会心理学》
    • 《历史决定论的贫困》
    • 《金融炼金术》
    • 《摆脱共情》
    • 《超越金融》
    • 《投资最重要的事》
    • 《后疫情时代:大重构》
    • 《传染:为什么疾病、金融危机和社会行为会流行?》
    • 《专业投机原理》
  • 记录
    • 关于媒介的想法和猜想
    • 偏见的真伪和消除偏见
    • 「暴政之课」
    • 逆向淘汰/内卷:体制问题的遮羞布何时撤下
    • 不确定性:归因偏差与认知象限
    • 常见的网络审查误解
    • 写博客难以坚持的底层原因和实证解决
    • 回顾《物种起源》:对达尔文的误解与社会启发
    • 意识形态、合法性和心理疾病
    • 语言腐败:写博客的初心
    • 回顾大重置
    • 唯物历史主义最终败给了市场
    • 意识形态、合法性和心理疾病
    • 自然科学的研究方法:行为经济学的贫困
    • 《开放社会及其未来》:柏拉图衰败论的现代意义
    • 语言腐败:写博客的初心
    • 青春疼痛文学的消逝:温室教育下的绝望
    • 政府的艺术
    • 使用Rinkeby与IPFS铸造专属NFTitled
    • 杠铃策略:逃离债市
    • 去中心化治理与通证国家
    • 使用syntropy stack搭建wireguard
    • 期货复盘总结1
    • The Regret Minimization Framework:遗憾最小化框架
    • Defi估值:Market cap/TVL
    • 回到原点:投资思维
    • 对谐波交易的补充(价格行为篇)
    • 杠铃策略:正凸性效应(资产配置篇)
    • 教育的「假性正向」
    • 娱乐至死2.0:你没有选择
    • 因果无序:对《人口:中国的悬剑》的补充
    • 稳定币操纵市场的可能性
    • 反脆弱:空前的稳定只是表象,隐性凸显反脆弱性
    • Skin in the game:不对称陷阱的基本原理
    • 为何一定的不平等是有必要的?
    • 探讨贫富不均的逻辑
    • 科学哲学和危机干预的悖论
    • 谬误性和反身性对反馈环的作用
    • 后疫情时代:市场去杠杆化
    • 后疫情时代:混沌政治格局
    • 后疫情时代:不可避免的恶性通胀
    • 传染网络和梅特卡夫定律
    • 人们是否可以理性地共情?在中国为何难以摆脱共情?我们应该做些什么?
    • 繁荣的悖论:在最不可能出现繁荣的地方创造繁荣
    • 现象终究是表象:技术主导地位不可撼动
    • 组合进化:对技术的追逐不会有尽头
    • 代币经济和美国金融监管的冲突:SEC对Ripple的71页投诉报告解析
    • 股票的反身性
    • 反身性的矛盾:否定还是承认
  • Archive
    • Archive归档用处
    • 後革命的幽靈(三):耽美文學的愛與暴力|戴錦華
    • 网络文摘:客观评价习近平
    • 【暴政之課.前言】當暴政成為事實 歷史給香港人的教訓
    • 【暴政之課.1】專訪哈維爾傳記作者 共產捷克給香港人的啟示:活得磊落,就是對抗極權
    • 【暴政之課.2】專訪韓國光州紀錄片導演 重光前的沉寂期 守護真相直至「那天」來臨
    • 【暴政之課.3】專訪台灣學者吳乃德:長達 38 年的恐怖戒嚴 唯靠人的意志穿越黑暗
    • 【暴政之課.4】跟蹤、監視、封殺、抓捕 — 中國維權人士的經歷(及香港新日常)
    • 【暴政之課.5】在末日來臨前 戴著腳鐐跳舞的公民行動者
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  1. 记录

代币经济和美国金融监管的冲突:SEC对Ripple的71页投诉报告解析

上一页组合进化:对技术的追逐不会有尽头下一页股票的反身性

最后更新于3年前

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1.From at least 2013 through the present, Defendants sold over 14.6 billion units of adigital asset security called “XRP,” in return for cash or other consideration worth over $1.38 billion U.S. Dollars (“USD”), to fund Ripple’s operations and enrich Larsen and Garlinghouse. Defendants undertook this distribution without registering their offers and sales of XRP with the SEC as required by the federal securities laws, and no exemption from this requirement applied.2.Because Ripple never filed a registration statement, it never provided investors withthe material information that every year hundreds of other issuers include in such statements when soliciting public investment. Instead, Ripple created an information vacuum such that Ripple and the two insiders with the most control over it—Larsen and Garlinghouse—could sell XRP into a market that possessed only the information Defendants chose to share about Ripple and XRP.3. Ripple engaged in this illegal securities offering from 2013 to the present, eventhough Ripple received legal advice as early as 2012 that under certain circumstances XRP could be considered an “investment contract” and therefore a security under the federal securities laws.3. Ripple engaged in this illegal securities offering from 2013 to the present, eventhough Ripple received legal advice as early as 2012 that under certain circumstances XRP could be considered an “investment contract” and therefore a security under the federal securities laws. 4. Ripple and Larsen ignored this advice and instead elected to assume the risk of initiating a large-scale distribution of XRP without registration.5.From a financial perspective, the strategy worked. Over a years-long unregisteredoffering of securities (the “Offering”), Ripple was able to raise at least $1.38 billion by selling XRP without providing the type of financial and managerial information typically provided in registration statements and subsequent periodic and current filings. Ripple used this money to fund its operations without disclosing how it was doing so, or the full extent of its payments to others to assist in its efforts to develop a “use” for XRP and maintain XRP secondary trading markets.6.Meanwhile, Larsen—Ripple’s initial chief executive officer (“CEO”) and currentchairman of the Board—and Garlinghouse—Ripple’s current CEO—orchestrated these unlawful sales and personally profited by approximately $600 million from their unregistered sales of XRP.7.Garlinghouse did so while repeatedly touting that he was “very long” XRP, meaninghe held a significant position he expected to rise in value, without disclosing his sales of XRP.8.Defendants continue to hold substantial amounts of XRP and—with no registrationstatement in effect—can continue to monetize their XRP while using the information asymmetry they created in the market for their own gain, creating substantial risk to investors. Case 1:20-cv-10832 Document 4 Filed 12/22/20 Page 2 of 713VIOLATIONS9. By engaging in the conduct set forth in this Complaint, Defendants engaged in and are currently engaging in the unlawful offer and sale of securities in violation of Sections 5(a) and 5(c) of the Securities Act of 1933 (“Securities Act”) [15 U.S.C. §§ 77e(a) and 77e(c)], and Larsen and Garlinghouse also aided and abetted Ripple’s violations of those provisions.10. Unless Defendants are permanently restrained and enjoined, they will continue to engage in the acts, practices, and courses of business set forth in this Complaint and in acts, practices, and courses of business of similar type and object.NATURE OF THE PROCEEDING AND RELIEF SOUGHT11. The Commission brings this action pursuant to the authority conferred upon it by Section 20(b) of the Securities Act [15 U.S.C. § 77t(b)].12. The Commission seeks a final judgment: (a) permanently enjoining Defendants from violating Sections 5(a) and 5(c) of the Securities Act, pursuant to Section 20(b) of the Securities Act [15 U.S.C. § 77t(b)]; (b) pursuant to Section 21(d)(5) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (“Exchange Act”), (i) ordering Defendants to disgorge their ill-gotten gains and to pay prejudgment interest thereon and (ii) prohibiting Defendants from participating in any offering of digital asset securities; and (c) imposing civil money penalties on Defendants pursuant to Section 20(d) of the Securities Act [15 U.S.C § 77t(d)].

——SEC对Ripple诉讼的既要内容

1.没有向SEC登记,违反联邦证券法,即使是代币也不给予豁免

2.坐庄,Ripple创造了信息真空(空气),出售给有权分享市场信息的市场

3.以前没有被投诉是因为Ripple的商业行为被当作是一份投资合同,由联邦证券法规定

4.Ripple忽视提议,仍然大规模发行代币

5.XRP出售至少出售13.8亿美元,没有任何形式上的披露,并用于维护二级市场

6.CEO精心策划了这些非法销售代币行为

7.Garlinghouse吹嘘XRP

8.被告持有大量XRP,XRP代币化,利用市场的不对称信息给投资者带来巨大风险

9.违法5(a)证券法

10.法律上永久受到约束和制约

其中法律文件中提到一点“数字代币可以由相对应的交易所上进行交易,而不必通过区块链地址转移到另一个地址上“,尽管区块链是透明的,但是SEC指责Ripple是在使用不对称的信息在谋利,同时暗示质疑区块链的不合理性。

”尽管每个节点都有自己定义的信任服务器,但他们高度重叠“反映Ripple的区块链实际上是高度中心化

Ripple的律师警告,XRP可能是证券

作为以一个证券,不按照联邦证券法重点披露,仅仅使用”投资合同“的方式进行投资而非常规手段。根据《交易法》,XRP不太可能视为货币,没有中央政府的支持,也不是法定货币。

Ripple努力地增加交易量和投机需求,而Ripple地所作所为正是充斥着投机市场。目前XRP是第三大市值加密货币,而加密货币市场地水不受监管纠结是好事还是坏事,去中心化金融和SEC的”冷战“才刚刚开始,目前不少美国企业购买比特币作为资产,这样的资产是否会被SEC认可是非常关键的,目前比特币在美国是以商品的形式认可,换而言之,除了比特币,其他加密货币资产都很难被SEC认可。

2021/7/11补充

现在的Ripple离股权通证化的路越走越远,反倒是科技企业AAPL、AMZN、COIN等登上了支持股权通证的交易所,Ripple仍然无法讲XRP和当下股权结合,面对长期监管部门施加的压力。